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THE ROOTS OF INNOVATION†
Vertical Integration and Competition
By PHILIPPE AGHION, RACHEL GRIFFITH, AND PETER HOWITT*
This paper is part of a research program an-
alyzing how competition affects aggregate in-
novative activity through its effects on firms’
organization. In previous work (Aghion et al.,
2005a), we found an inverted-U shaped rela-
tionship between competition and innovation.
Our explanation emphasized the “composition
effect” of competition on the steady-state dis-
tribution of technological gaps across indus-
tries. Our focus here is on firms’ decisions
whether or not to integrate vertically with their
suppliers. We provide evidence of a U-shaped
relationship between competition and vertical
integration. Our explanation is based on the
following idea: a moderate increase in product
market competition will reduce a producer’s
incentive to integrate by improving the outside
options of her nonintegrated suppliers and
hence raising their incentive to innovate. Too
much competition will raise the producer’s in-
centive to integrate, however, by allowing non-
integrated suppliers to capture most of the
innovation surplus.
Finding a U-shaped relationship between
competition and vertical integration sheds light
on the debate over the “Transaction Cost Eco-
nomics” (TCE) approach to vertical integration
pioneered by Oliver Williamson (1975, 1985)
versus the “Property Right Theory” (PRT) ap-
proach developed by Sanford Grossman and
Oliver Hart (1986) and by Hart and John Moore
(1990).1 According to the TCE approach, ver-
tical integration is a way for contracting parties
involved in a specific relationship to limit ex
post bargaining inefficiencies due to holdup and
thereby minimize the loss in ex ante investment
that would result from it. This approach thus
predicts a positive correlation between vertical
integration and the degree of relation specific-
ity. According to the PRT approach, the own-
ership structure will affect not so much the ex
post bargaining efficiency as the relative bar-
gaining powers of the (two) contracting parties,
and therefore their relative ex ante investment
incentives. Thus, while vertical integration should
enhance both parties’ investments positively in
the TCE approach by reducing the extent of ex
post inefficiency, in the PRT approach owner-
ship by one party, say the buyer, will enhance
the buyer’s ex ante incentives at the expense of
the seller’s, as it enhances the buyer’s bargain-
ing power ex post at the expense of the seller’s.2
Thus, the TCE approach predicts that increased
competition on the producer’s (or supplier’s)
market, which reduces the overall degree of
asset specificity, should therefore reduce the
need for vertical integration in order to preserve
ex ante investment incentives by either party.
On the other hand, as we show below, the PRT
approach allows the U-shaped relationship be-
tween vertical integration and competition that
we find empirically.
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1 Michael Whinston (2001) first derived testable impli-
cations of the two approaches.
2 Daron Acemoglu et al. (2004) use cross-industry panel
data to discriminate between the two theories. Using tech-
nology intensity to measure relationship-specific invest-
ments, they look at the relationship between pairs of
supplying and producing industries and show that, as pre-
dicted by the PRT approach, (backward) vertical integration
is significantly correlated with the investment incentives of
suppliers and producers, as measured by their respective
R&D intensities, but with opposite signs.
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I. Basic Framework
Consider an economy composed of individu-
als with risk-neutral preferences for consump-
tion. A general good is produced under perfect
competition with a continuum of intermediate
inputs, according to
y  
0
1
xi
 di, 0    1.
We focus on a representative intermediate sec-
tor, dropping the i subscript from here on. In
each sector, a monopolist produces her interme-
diate product according to
x  fq, s
where q is the input of a general good used as
capital and s is the input of a specialized good
used only in this sector, and available in supply
equal to one. The production function for the
intermediate product is
fq, s  q if s 10 otherwise.
Thus, the specialized input s is indispensable to
production.
Although she enjoys monopoly power, the
intermediate good producer may face a com-
petitive fringe of potential imitators that can
produce the same intermediate product but at
higher unit cost. An imitator’s production
function is
f mq, s  aq if s 10 otherwise
where a  1 is a direct measure of the degree of
product market competition in the intermediate
input market.
If the incumbent firm (the “entrepreneur”) in
this sector manages to obtain the services of the
specialized input producer (the “manager”) in
that sector, she faces no effective competition,
since potential imitators then do not have access
to the specialized input. The incumbent firm can
then sell to the general sector at the uncon-
strained monopoly price, which is equal to the
marginal product of the intermediate good in
producing the general good:
p  x 1.
Thus, the intermediate producer will choose x to
maximize joint surplus, namely
  max
x
x  x,
which yields
  1  1 /1 .
Before determining how this surplus is di-
vided between the entrepreneur and the man-
ager, we need to compute what the manager
would obtain if he sold his specialized input
to an imitator. Since the fringe of imitators
is competitive, the manager should get the
whole surplus, m, from selling to an imita-
tor. That surplus, in turn, is determined by the
same maximization program as above, except
that the production function f is replaced by
f m, namely
m  max
x
x  x/a,
which yields
m  
where
  a/1 
is also a measure of product market
competition.
At the beginning of each period the entre-
98 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MAY 2006
preneur in any sector decides whether or not
to integrate with her manager. Then she in-
vests in quality-enhancing innovation. If she
successfully innovates, then she turns to the
manager in that sector for him to come up
with a component for the new technology.
Then a competitive fringe of potential imita-
tors shows up with probability   0. After
the fringe shows up (or not), if the component
has been successfully produced then the en-
trepreneur and the manager bargain over the
surplus. Otherwise they both get zero profits,
as the previous technology keeps prevailing
in that sector.
We now analyze the outcome of ex post
bargaining between the entrepreneur and the
manager in each sector. First, if a competitive
fringe of imitators has shown up, the entrepre-
neur must concede m to the manager to secure
his specialized input. If no competitive fringe
shows up, or if the entrepreneur integrates back-
ward with her manager, then ex post bargaining
results in the entrepreneur and the manager
splitting the total surplus 50-50, so that each
gets /2.
The entrepreneur in any sector must invest in
R&D in order to innovate. Innovation, in turn,
creates the profit opportunity . The R&D cost
of innovating with probability z is
dz  zu1/u1 , u1 	 1.
Once a new technology has been invented by
the entrepreneur, the manager must create a
suitable input or component for that new tech-
nology, and her cost of generating such a com-
ponent with probability e is
ce  eu2/u2 , u2 	 1.
II. Competition and the Integration Choice
Suppose that the entrepreneur has chosen to
integrate backward with her manager, yielding
/2 to each party if both innovate. Once a new
technology has been successfully invented, the
manager will choose the probability e of dis-
covering the complementary component so as
to maximize his expected profit
e/2  ce,
which yields
eV  /2
2
where 
2 	 (u2  1)1 measures the marginal
efficiency of the manager’s effort. This choice
is unconstrained by any contractual obligation
because it cannot be verified.
Moving back one step further, anticipating
innovation effort eV by the manager, the entre-
preneur will choose her own R&D intensity z to
earn the maximal payoff
(1) UV  max
z
zeV/2 dz.
Next, suppose that the entrepreneur has cho-
sen not to integrate. Then, once a new tech-
nology has been successfully invented the
manager will choose the probability e so as to
maximize
e  1  /2  ce,
which yields
eN    1  /2
2
2,
which is greater than eV if the competitive
fringe is binding (  1⁄2), which we now as-
sume. Moving back again one step, anticipating
innovation effort eN by the manager, the entre-
preneur will choose her own R&D intensity z to
earn the maximal payoff
(2) UN  max
z
zeN1 
 1  /2  dz.
Now consider what happens as the degree of
competition  varies. Comparison of (1) with
(2) yields
LEMMA 1: As the degree of competition 
increases from 1⁄2 to 1, the difference UV  UN
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either always decreases, always increases, or
follows a U-shape (first decreasing and then
increasing). The U-shape will be observed if
and only if the marginal efficiency, 
2, of the
manager’s effort is large enough and the prob-
ability of imitation, , is large enough relative
to 
2.
PROOF:
Consider the function
    1 /2
21 
 1  /2.
Once we fully spell out the expressions for (1)
and (2), we see that UV  UN, regarded as a
function of , is a positive monotone transfor-
mation of the function , which in turn is either
increasing, or decreasing, or U-shaped in ; the
third case occurs if and only if 
2  1 and  
(
2  1)/(
2  1).
Suppose that there is an administrative cost,
cV, of organizing a vertically integrated firm and
a cost, cN, of organizing a nonintegrated firm.
The net cost of integration, cV  cN, is distrib-
uted randomly across sectors. So the incidence
of vertical integration, v, will be the fraction of
sectors in which the realization of this net cost
is less than the net benefit UV  UN. Thus, it
follows directly from Lemma 1 that:
PROPOSITION 1: The incidence of vertical
integration v cannot be inverted U-shaped with
respect to the degree of product market compe-
tition ; it is either increasing, or decreasing, or
U-shaped. It will be U-shaped when the mar-
ginal efficiency, 
2, of the manager’s effort is
large enough and the probability of imitation 
is large enough relative to 
2.
III. Empirical Evidence
We are interested in investigating whether the
propensity for firms to integrate vertically varies
systematically with the extent of competition in
the product market. We use a measure of vertical
integration developed in Acemoglu et al. (2004),
and we use variation in entry rates across indus-
tries to proxy competition.
We use a large nationally representative data set
on all U.K. manufacturing plants3 over a 13-year
3 This is the U.K. Annual Business Inquiry (ABI), also
known as the ARD data. See Acemoglu et al. (2005) for
further details. The ARD contains information on all pro-
TABLE 1—VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND ENTRY RATES
(1)
Total entry
(2)
Total entry
(3)
Total entry
(4)
Foreign entry
Producing entry rate 0.618 0.149 0.666 0.606
(0.104) (0.070) (0.101) (0.250)
Producing entry rate2 0.989 0.347 1.023 11.507
(0.223) (0.177) (0.210) (3.937)
Supplying entry rate 0.581 0.230 1.524
(0.084) (0.029) (0.352)
Supplying entry rate2 1.462 0.106 50.712
(0.199) (0.033) (7.350)
Age 0.006 0.003 0.008
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Employment 0.012 0.01 0.012
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Foreign-owned 0.081 0.036 0.090
(0.041) (0.036) (0.042)
Share of inputs imported 0.040
(0.016)
Notes: 15,990 observations at the industry-pair year level, 1980–1992. Dependent variable is proportion of firms in industry
pair that are vertically integrated. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors, clustered at level of 181 producing
industries. Year effects included in all regressions.
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period (1980–1992) combined with information
from the U.K. Input-Output Tables. We identify
whether each firm in a producing industry is ver-
tically integrated or not with any firm in each
potential supplying industry. Plants are identi-
fied by their 4-digit industry. The Input-Output
Table indicate the linkages between industries.
The Input-Output Table contains information
on 77 manufacturing industries (supplying and
producing).4
We denote a firm as vertically integrated in
an industry pair if: (a) there is a trade flow
representing at least 1 percent of costs be-
tween firms in that producing and supplying
industry (indicated in the IO Table); and (b)
the firm owns at least one plant operating in
each industry. We use these data at the level
of the producing-supplying industry pair for
each year by aggregating to the industry pair
level, defining a variable that is the proportion
of producing firms in each industry pair that
also own a plant in the supplying industry.
The mean of this variable is just under 15
percent. We proxy competition using the en-
try rate (the number of new firms over the
total number of firms) and the entry rate of
foreign firms.
The first column of the table shows the
correlation between the entry rate (as a proxy
for competition) and the proportion of pro-
ducing firms that are vertically integrated
with a supplier. The probability of vertical
integration is initially declining in competi-
tion but then, at higher levels of competition,
is increasing. In column 2, we include the
entry rate in the supplying industry along with
the average age and size (measured by em-
ployment) of firms in the producing industry,
and the proportion of firms in the producing
industry that are foreign-owned. Figure
1 shows the pattern of this correlation, nor-
malized to zero at zero entry. At lower levels
of entry, as entry increases, the probability of
vertical integration declines (in line with both
PRT and TCE approaches). This gradually
diminishes and, above a certain level, the
correlation switches. As a robustness check in
column 3 we also include the share of inputs
(used by producers) that are imported.
In column 4 we use an alternative entry rate,
looking just at entry by foreign firms. We
might be concerned that entry is a noisy meas-
ure of competition. Foreign firms are in general
larger and represent a more substantial compet-
itive threat.5 Figure 2 plots the relationship be-
tween entry and vertical integration implied by
these estimates. Here we see the upward part of
the curve dominates—in line with the predic-
tions of the PRT approach but not the TCE
approach.
duction activity located in the United Kingdom. Location,
ownership structure, industry, and employment are reported
on all plants. Single-plant firms are identified as those
reporting units that represent only one plant and that have
no sibling, parent, or child plants. Single plants with fewer
than 20 employees are dropped from the analysis.
4 We use the Input-Output Table for 1995, available at
www.statistics.gov.uk. 5 See Aghion et al. (2005b).
FIGURE 1. CORRELATION BETWEEN ENTRY AND VERTICAL
INTEGRATION
(Calculated using estimates from column (2) of table 1)
FIGURE 2. CORRELATION BETWEEN FOREIGN ENTRY AND
VERTICAL INTEGRATION
(Calculated using estimates from column (4) of Table 1)
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IV. Concluding Comments
In this paper, we have provided some prelim-
inary evidence to suggest that there is a nonlin-
ear relationship between competition and the
propensity of firms to integrate vertically. These
results seem to be more consistent with the PRT
approach of vertical integration than with the
TCE approach and they also suggest that orga-
nizational considerations may partly explain the
observed inverted-U relationship between com-
petition and innovation.
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